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Abstract:We propose an alternative quantum cryptography protocol using the
quantum interference effect. The efficiency of creating sifted key can reach 100% in
principle, which is higher than previous protocols. Especially, compared with the
typical quantum key distribution, the present scheme does not require the authorized
parties to check their bases. Because the potential eavesdropper can only access
part of the quantum system, the proposed scheme has natural practical security
advantages. The scheme can be implemented with current technologies and opens
promising possibilities for quantum cryptography.
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Quantum cryptography provides an unconditional security method to distribute secret
keys between two remote parties based on the fundamental principles of quantum mechanics
[1–3]. Quantum key distribution (QKD) is the first application of quantum mechanics in the
practical communications. Due to the promising application prospect, quantum cryptogra-
phy has been studied extensively. Various QKD protocols have been continuously proposed
during the past two decades [4–6], and the experimental techniques of the practical QKD is
reaching maturity [7, 8]. All these QKD protocols require signal particles to be transmitted
in the quantum channel between the two parties, i.e. the creation of secret keys relies on
the transmission of the carrier of secret information.
However, Noh presented a novel QKD protocol [9], called counterfactual quantum cryp-
tography, which showed the QKD task can be accomplished even though signal particles were
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2not transmitted through the quantum channel. Due to the counterfactuality and novelty,
Noh’s protocol has attracted widespread attention [10–15]. The security of the counterfac-
tual quantum cryptography was analyzed in an ideal situation [11, 12], and the protocol was
demonstrated in experiment [13–15]. The basic idea of Noh’s protocol originated from the
interaction-free measurement [16]. The presence of an obstacle in one of the arms of a Mach-
Zehnder interferometer will destroy the interference even through no photon interacted with
the obstacle. In Noh’s protocol, it can be considered that Bob, one of the two participants,
encoded secret bits by the presence or not of the obstacle. The creation of a sifted key is
only from the events that interference is destroyed and the photon is not absorbed. The
efficiency of the sifted key creation is 12.5%, which has been improved to 50% subsequently
by Sun and Wen [10].
Here we present an alternative quantum cryptography protocol just by using the quantum
interference rather than destroying the interference. Compared with the existing protocols,
the present scheme has higher efficiency of the sifted key creation that can be approached
to 100% in the ideal case. The security can be guaranteed by avoiding the eavesdropper to
access the entire quantum system. The architecture of the proposed protocol is shown in
Fig. 1. The two remote parties in the communication are called Alice and Bob. A long-
armed Michelson-type interferometer is established between Alice and Bob. At the beginning
Alice triggers the single-photon source SPS to emit a linearly polarized single photon. The
polarization of the photon is chosen randomly, and Alice encodes horizontal polarization |H〉
and vertical polarization |V 〉 as logic “0” and “1”, respectively. The photon passes through
the optical circulator C firstly, and is then rotated by the half-wave plate HWP oriented
at 22.5◦, whose action can be given by {|H〉 → 1√
2
(|H〉 + |V 〉), |V 〉 → 1√
2
(|H〉 − |V 〉)}.
Subsequently, the polarizing beam splitter PBS1 splits the photon into two pathes a and
b. The path a leads to the mirror M1 located in Alice’s site, and the path b goes toward
the mirror M2 at Bob’s site. So after passing through the PBS1, the quantum state can be
expressed as
|φ0〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉b + |V 〉a),
|φ1〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉b − |V 〉a), (1)
where subscripts 0 and 1 indicate Alice chooses bit value 0 and 1, respectively, i.e. she
launches |H〉 and |V 〉 photons. a and b label the two arms of the interferometer.
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FIG. 1: Schematic for the proposed QKD protocol. Two pathes a and b form a Michelson-type
interferometer. SPS: single-photon source. C: optical circulator. HWP: half-wave plate. PBS:
polarizing beam splitter. OD: optical delay used to maintain the phase by compensating the path
difference of the two pathes. M: totally reflecting mirror. The phase shifter PS in a dashed box
indicates that Bob can randomly remove or insert the PS in path b.
Phase shifter PS in Bob’s site can introduce a pi phase for photons in the path b, i.e.
|H/V 〉b → −|H/V 〉b. Optical delay OD in path a is used to match the optical path lengthes
of the two arms. Bob encodes his bit on the presence or not of the PS, that is, removing the
PS represents bit value “0”, and inserting the PS represents bit value “1”. Bob randomly
modulates the phase of the photon pulse in path b by {0, pi}. Through straightforward
calculation, it can be obtained that if Alice’s and Bob’s bit values are equal, the phase
difference is 0 between the two paths, so after leaving the interferometer, the photon will
go toward the detector D1 by passing through C and PBS2 with certainty owing to the
interference effect. However, if Alice’s and Bob’s bit values are opposite, the phase difference
of the two paths is pi and the photon will go toward the detector D2. Therefore, if D1 clicks,
Alice and Bob can obtain an identical bit; if D2 clicks, Alice flips her bit and they can also
obtain an identical bit. Because of the loss or the interception of the potential eavesdropper
Eve, it’s possible that both D1 and D2 don’t clicks. In this case, Alice announces her
nondetection events, and they discard their bits. By this way, a sifted key can be established
between Alice and Bob. In order to detect the potential eavesdropper Eve, they can select
portions of the sifted key to estimate the error rate. Then they can also perform error
correction and privacy amplification on the remaining sifted key as in conventional QKD
4protocol.
From the statement above, every Bob’s detection result is effective for creating sifted key,
which is different form the previous protocols with noneffective detection results. In ideal
cases, every single-photon pulse sent in the interferometer can create an identical bit, the
overall efficiency of creating a sifted key can thus reach 100%. Therefore, the present protocol
fundamentally improves the creation efficiency of sifted key. Furthermore, Alice only needs
to announce the events that there is no detector clicks. Hence, the present scheme does not
need that the authorized parties to check their bases during the process of creating sifted
keys, which is very different from the other existing protocols, and classical communication
resource is greatly saved.
The security of the present protocol can be verified by using the new type of no-cloning
principle of orthogonal states proposed by Noh [9]. The conventional no-cloning principle
[17, 18] suggests that that orthogonal states in a composite system made of two subsystems
cannot be cloned if the subsystems are only available one after the other. In Ref. [9], Noh
proposed a new type of no-cloning principle of orthogonal states for the case that only one
subsystem can be accessed while the other one can never be accessed. That is, “if reduced
density matrices of an available subsystem are nonorthogonal and if the other subsystem
is not allowed access, it is impossible to distinguish two orthogonal quantum states without
disturbing them”. Adding the vacuum state in one of the arms of the interferometer, the
quantum states after a photon enter the interferometer can be rewritten as
|Ψ0〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉a|H〉b + |V 〉a|0〉b),
|Ψ1〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉a|H〉b − |V 〉a|0〉b), (2)
where |0〉k(k = a, b) denotes the vacuum state in the path k. The subsystem Eve can access
is the path b, and the reduced density matrices of the available subsystem can be obtained
Tr[ρ0(path b)ρ1(path b)] =
1
4
6= 0, where ρi(path b) = Trpath a[|Ψi〉〈Ψi|] (i = 0, 1). Therefore,
the reduced density matrices of the available subsystem path b are nonorthogonal, and the
other subsystem path a is not allowed access for Eve. According to the new no-cloning
principle of orthogonal states, Eve can’t distinguish the two states without disturbing them,
which ensures the security of the proposed protocol.
For the stabilized interferometer, a specific detector will be triggered for given Alice’s
and Bob’s bit values due to the quantum interference. If Eve performs intercept-resend
5(I-R) attack on path b, the “which-path” information of the photon will be revealed and the
optical path length will also be prolonged, which are bound to destroy the interference and
each of the two detectors may click with the probability of 50% for all the bit values of Alice
and Bob. That is, a 50% error rate will be introduced in the sifted key. Thus, this attack will
be discovered by the subsequent error estimation process. If the protocol is implemented by
use of polarization multiphoton pulses, it may be undergo photon-number splitting (PNS)
attack. However, the PNS attack will break the balance of the pulse intensity in the two
pathes, and the two detectors may be triggered simultaneously, which will be found by Alice.
Then she informs Bob to discard this bit. One the other hand, even through Eve intercept
photons from path b, she cannot obtain any information about secret bit values of Alice and
Bob. Therefore, the proposed protocol is robust against typical I-R attack and PNS attack
strategies.
The experiment setup for implementing the proposed protocol is very simple, and all the
components and devices are ordinary optical elements in optical laboratory. In the actual
implementation, there may be two technical challenges. Firstly, the protocol is very depen-
dent on quantum interference in the interferometer, so a stabilized long-armed interferometer
should be established between Alice and Bob, which may be a challenge in experiment. The
other challenge is that an ultrafast optical switch is needed for Bob to control the presence
or absence of the PS in path b. Nevertheless, recent experimental progresses provide posi-
tive possibilities for overcoming these issues. Stabilized interferometers with several tens of
kilometers have been reported [19, 20]. Suitable ultrafast optical switch with minimal loss
and without disturbing the photon’s quantum state has been demonstrated with switching
window of 10 ps [21, 22]. Hence the present protocol is feasible under the current experimen-
tal conditions. In addition, it should be noted that there are two equivalent implementation
schemes for the proposed protocol. The first one is that Alice uses the same encoding ap-
proach as Bob in path a. In this version, Alice only needs to launch single photons with
identical polarization into the interferometer. The other equivalent approach is to utilize
a Mach-Zehnder (M-Z) type interferometer to implement the protocol. Construct a M-Z
interferometer between Alice and Bob, both of input and output ports are in Alice’s site,
and only a portion of one arm in Bob’s site. Bob still encodes his bits using the presence or
not of PS, and Alice encodes secret bits with the two input modes of the M-Z interferometer.
This version does not rely on the photon’s polarization, so it reduces the requirement of the
6single-photon source.
In summary, we have proposed a new protocol for QKD based on quantum interference
effect, in which Bob encodes his secret bits on the removing or inserting of a phase shifter.
Because the protocol is sensitive to interference, the potential eavesdropper Eve is easily de-
tected. Eve doesn’t have full access to the entire quantum system, so the protocol is security
according to the no-cloning principle of orthogonal states. In ideal cases, the efficiency of
creating sifted key can theoretically reach 100%, and the authorized parties are not required
to check their bases during the process of creating sifted keys. All the devices of the imple-
mentation scheme are available currently, hence the protocol has the advantages of feasibility
and high efficiency and may provide an interesting approach for quantum cryptography.
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